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This paper examines the influence of adult market wages and having parents who were child 
labourers on child labour, when this decision is jointly determined with child schooling, 
using data from Egypt. The empirical results suggest that low adult market wages are key 
determinants of child labour; a 10 percent increase in the illiterate male market wage 
decreases the probability of child labour by 22 percent for boys and 13 percent for girls. The 
findings also indicate the importance of social norms in the inter-generational persistence of 
child labour: parents who were child labourers themselves are on average 10 percent more 
likely to send their children to work. In addition, higher local regional income inequality 
increases the likelihood of child labour.  
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1. Introduction 
The most recent estimates by the ILO indicate that there are about 211 million 
children, less than 14 years old, working world-wide.
1 Many of these children work long 
hours under hazardous conditions and all receive a low wage. Despite public concern for 
the prevalence of child labour, there is widespread disagreement on the desirability, and 
indeed feasibility, of banning child labour. The formulation of effective policies to tackle 
child labour requires the accumulation of further empirical evidence on the main causes 
and consequences of child labour. 
A ban on child labour may be welfare reducing for both children and parents if poverty 
is the main cause of child labour. In a seminal paper, Basu and Van (1998) show that in 
poor countries where market wages are low, banning child labour can worsen household 
welfare. In their model, parents are assumed to be altruistic and send their children to 
work only if their non-child labour income is below a tolerable level. However, empirical 
studies testing this “luxury axiom” fail to consistently find a negative relationship between 
household income and child labour, for example Ray (2000) and Bhalotra (2001). Unlike 
previous studies, this paper is not interested in testing the luxury axiom i.e. the impact of 
household income/poverty on child labour, but in providing empirical evidence on the 
sensitivity of household supply of child labour to adult market  wages. There are no 
empirical studies which use individual level data to study the impact of adult market 
wages on child labour.  
The main motivation behind studying the influence of adult market wages on child 
labour is its potential policy implications. For example, whether minimum wage laws can 
ameliorate child labour, hinge on the sensitivity of child labour to adult market wages- see 
Basu (2000). Also, targeting poor regions or deprived geographical areas, where wages are 
low, may be a more practical and viable policy than targeting poor individual households   3
since it is potentially easier to get information on market wages compared to collecting 
accurate data on individual households’ income and because targeting working children 
might lead parents to sending their children to work in order to receive the subsidy or the 
cash benefit.  
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the influence of adult market wages 
on the household decision to supply child labour while controlling for household specific 
characteristics. This is implemented by using a national individual level data-set and by 
exploiting the spatial variation in market adult and child wages in order to identify the 
wage elasticity of household child labour supply by a representative household. Hence the 
paper will address the following two questions. Are households more likely to send their 
children to work if they live in regions where wages are low? How sensitive is 
households’ supply of child labour to market adult wages? In addition, the paper 
contributes to the child labour literature by exploring two issues that have had received 
very little attention: the influence of having parents who were child labourers themselves 
on the inter-generational persistence of child labour, and the impact of local regional 
income inequality. 
  One of the disconcerting aspects of child labour is that it is often performed at the 
expense of education. However, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) question the view that child 
labour comes largely at the expense of schooling.
2 Schooling and employment for children 
are not mutually exclusive. Many children have to work in order to go to school; 
otherwise they could not afford to go to school.
3 This combination of school attendance 
and work is facilitated by the provision of shift schools in many developing countries.
4 
Given the close relationship between the schooling and work choices, this study explores 
the variables of interest in a model that jointly determines child labour and child 
schooling, and tests for the interdependence of these two decisions.    4
This paper examines the case of Egypt using a nationally representative data set, 
covering 10,000 households and more than 10,000 children. Egypt is well-suited for our 
analysis because work and school combination among Egyptian working children is 
common practice - more than half of the working children combine working and 
schooling. In addition, Egypt is not an outlier or an extreme case of child labour. The ILO 
estimates in 1995 show that the economic activity rates in Egypt, among 10 to 14 years 
old was around 11.2 % - which is higher than the regional average for Latin America 
(9.8%), but less than that for Africa (26.2%) and Asia (12.8%)- though there is a wide 
variation in the participation rates of 10-14 years old children within the same region.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on child labour. 
Section 3 describes the characteristics of child labour in Egypt. Section 4 presents the 
econometric model used. The main determinants of child labour and school participation 
are reported in Section 5. The main findings and policy implications are summarized in 
Section 6  
 
 
2. Literature Review  
One recent and notable theoretical contribution to the child labour literature is Basu and 
Van (1998) which is used to motivate the empirical analysis in this paper. Basu and Van 
(1998) assume that parents send their children to work only if they are poverty stricken– 
the luxury axiom. They take for granted parental altruism towards the child. Thus, in their 
model, a household only sends children to work if the household’s income (from non-
child-labour sources) is very low because adult wages are low. In their model, children 
allocate their time between work and leisure where leisure is a luxury good. In addition, 
they assume that from the employers’ point of view, adults and children are substitutes- 
the substitution axiom. These two assumptions imply that if any individual household   5
withdraws its children from work, the household will face acute poverty. But if all 
households withdraw all children from the labour market, given they assume that adults 
and children are substitutes, this will cause the demand for adults to rise and the wage rate 
of adult labour to increase. But if adult wages were at this higher level to start with, then 
the parents would not have sent their children out to work in the first place. They argue 
that if a labour market is characterised by more than one equilibrium – one in which adult 
wages are low and children work, and another where adult wages are high and children do 
not work- banning child labour is a benign policy. But, in very poor countries, where there 
is only one labour market equilibrium at which adult wages are low, banning child labour 
can worsen the households' welfare.  
Few studies have extended Basu and Van (1998) by examining the dynamics of child 
labour, for example, Basu (1999) and Emerson and Souza (2003). Those models take into 
account the trade off between child labour and schooling. Thus, they assume that child 
labour is undertaken at the expense of human capital formation and would lead to child 
labour trap: if children work, they will not go to school and will have low human capital. 
As adults, they will also need to send their children to work thereby perpetuating child 
labour in the future. 
Other studies have emphasised the role played by credit market imperfection. For 
example, Baland and Robinson (1999) show how inefficient child labour could arise 
despite parental altruism when capital markets are imperfect. Ranjan (1999) also shows 
that the non-existence of market for loans against the future earnings of children gives rise 
to inefficient child labour because child labour acts as a consumption smoothing device 
for poor households in the absence of credit markets. 
A few empirical studies have attempted to test Basu and Van’s (1998) luxury axiom in 
which they assume that households only send their children to work if they are poverty   6
stricken. Nevertheless, those studies do not consistently find a negative relationship 
between household income and child labour. For example, Ray (2000a) finds mixed 
evidence; a positive significant relationship between household poverty and child labour 
in the case of Pakistan, but not in the case of Peru. Nielsen (1998) finds that in the case of 
Zambia, poverty and low income have very small effects on the probability of child 
labour, and concludes that poverty is not the main cause of child labour in Zambia. 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) also find that household welfare has a weak effect on 
the probability of child labour in Ghana. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) find a negative 
income effect for boys in Pakistan, but they find no evidence that the work of girls in 
Pakistan, or the work of boys and girls in Ghana, is sensitive to household income. Most 
of these studies treat household income as exogenous- except for Bhalotra and Heady 
(2003) and Bhalotra (2001).
5 However, parents' income is most likely to be endogenous- 
since whether children work, or not, is likely to influence parents’ reservation wages and 
the labour market participation of the parents. Another potential problem with using 
household income is that it might not always reflect household welfare in developing 
countries, in particular in those societies where subsistence agriculture is common and 
households consume what they produce.  
Unlike previous studies, this paper is not concerned with testing the luxury axiom, 
but in providing empirical evidence on the sensitivity of household supply of child labour 
to adult market wages. The main focus in this paper is on market wages as opposed to 
household wages or income. As discussed above, Basu and Van (1998) stress the role of 
adult market wage; they assume that households send children to work only if the adult 
market wage is very low and as the wage rise they withdraw their children from the labour 
force. Thus, the elasticity of child labour supply to market adult wages is important in 
particular for policy formulation. Hence, understanding if households are more likely to   7
send their children to work if they live in regions where wages are low would help in 
devising effective policies to deal with child labour. There are no empirical studies using 
individual level data that examine the impact of adult market wages on child labour. 
Although Ray (2000b) investigates the impact of wages on the responsiveness of hours of 
child labour, he uses the maximum wage attracted by the female, male and child workers 
in the household and not market wages.  
Earlier studies using aggregate data -Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Rosenzweig 
(1981), Levy (1985), and Skoufias (1994) - focus on the trade-off between the number and 
the quality of children in rural areas.
6 The resulting evidence on the impact of adult market 
wages is inconclusive. Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) using aggregate district level data 
from rural India in the 1960s, find that both adult male and female wages have negative 
significant impact on boys and girls working. On the other, Skoufias (1994) using 
aggregate data from six villages in India but for the 1970s, find that adult wages do not 
have a significant influence on the probability of child participation in either the labour 
market or schooling. Levy (1985) using aggregate provincial level data from rural Egypt, 
though not distinguishing between boys and girls, shows that higher adult male wages 
have positive significant effect on child labour, while adult female wages have negative 
one,
7 but his focus is on the impact of cropping pattern and mechanisation on child labour 
and fertility in rural Egypt. 
  The second focus of this paper is on the inter-generational persistence of child 
labour and the influence of parents who worked as child labourers. The literature on the 
"underclass" has emphasized the extent to which poverty is passed from one generation to 
another in the United States. The large impact of family background on income status has 
been stressed by several studies, for example, Corcoran et al. (1990). Solon (1999) points 
out that it is conjectured that intergenerational transmission of economic status is   8
particularly strong, and mobility is lower, in LDCs. However, there is little empirical 
evidence on the intergenerational transmission of economic status, income or poverty in 
developing countries, in particular, on how child labour perpetuates poverty from one 
generation to another, or on how parents who were child labourers are more likely to have 
their children work as well. There are two recent exceptions. First, Ilahi, Orazem and 
Sedlacek (2000) examine the effect of child labour on lifetime earnings and poverty status 
using retrospective data on adult earnings and information on whether adults worked as 
children in Brazil. They find that entry in the workforce before age 13 results in a 
reduction in adult wages of 13-17 percent and an increase in the probability of being in the 
lowest two income quintiles of 7-8 percent.  They estimate the effect of child labour both 
independent of its effect on education and through its effects on education. They find both 
effects to be significant. They argue that early entry in the labour force reduces years of 
education and lowers the returns per year of schooling. Their focus is on the implications 
of child labour on wages, income and poverty. They do not study the intergenerational 
persistence of child labour; i.e. whether those who worked as children also had parents 
who worked as children. Secondly, a recent paper by Emerson and Souza (2003) explore 
the evidence of intergenerational persistence of child labour. They build an overlapping 
generation model of the household child labour decision to capture a child labour-trap 
story and then examine the empirical evidence using household survey data from Brazil. 
They find that adults who worked as children have lower earnings even when controlling 
for their educational levels and that the likelihood of being child labourer increases the 
younger the parents entered the labour market. Although they control for parental 
education and household income- which is endogenous-, the intergenerational persistence 
of child labour remains. They explain the persistence of child labour above that of parental 
education and household income, given their theoretical model, to be the result of some   9
unobservable human capital characteristic i.e. human capital accumulation is not 
determined only by the amount of education but also by maybe the quality of education, 
the level of education of siblings or the household environment.  In other words, they 
focus on the child labour-poverty trap explanation. However, this paper suggests a 
different explanation for the intergenerational persistence of child labour, namely social 
norms, as discussed below.
8 
The relationship between family background, such as race, ethnic origin, religion 
and in particular education, and child labour is fairly established in the empirical 
literature- see Grootaert and Kanbur (1995). Studies show that a low level of parents’ 
educational attainment is an important factor in increasing the likelihood of children 
working. One might argue that parents who worked as children are more likely to have 
under-invested in schooling and become poverty trapped and hence would expect their 
children to work as well i.e. the child labour-poverty trap explanation. Yet, what is 
interesting to explore is whether the effect of having parents who were child labourers will 
exist even after controlling for parents’ education. If there is still evidence of inter-
generational persistence of child labour then, it has to be for reasons beyond those which 
affect human capital and income, such as those caused by social norms.  
Social norms refer to social influence that affects individual’s preferences and 
therefore utility- see Basu (1999). As first argued by Lindbeck (1997) social norms 
interact with economic incentives and affect rational behaviour of individuals and 
households.  Lindbeck (1997) shows that work norms are affected by social norms, for 
example, parents may encourage good working habits in the younger generation to prevent 
free-riding on the altruism of others in the future. Thus, if parents worked themselves as 
children they may encourage their own offspring to work at an early age. Parents may 
want their children to follow in their own footsteps and learn the parents’ craft or they   10
may attribute a positive value to contribution to family work. For example, help on the 
family farm may be seen as an important value parents would like to teach their offspring. 
On the other hand as argued by Lopez-Calva (1999) in some societies child labour may be 
associated with a social stigma or social cost, for example shame, embarrassment or 
frowning upon from others. This would be reflected in lower utility for the parents and 
lower probability of household sending children to work. However, if parents worked 
themselves when they were children, they may consider child labour to be the social norm, 
and would associate lower social stigma with sending their children to work. The paper 
explores the impact of social norms on the probability of child labour by testing whether 
parents who themselves worked as child labourers are more likely to send their children to 
work or not. 
The third focus of this paper is the influence of unequal regional income 
distribution on child labor. In Basu and Van (1998) wages are the only source of adult 
income; i.e. employment is the only source of income for adults. However, in an extension 
of this model, Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) allow adults in at least some households to 
receive income from both wages and profits; i.e. allow some households to be 
shareholders in firms. They show that child labor would also exist if non-labor income 
(dividends/profits) were not equally distributed among households. They find that in 
precisely circumstances where, according to Basu and Van, a ban on child labor would be 
effective, child labor would exist because income is distributed unequally enough that 
families still must send their children to work in order to sustain themselves.
9 Ranjan 
(2001) explores in a theoretical framework the relationship between inequality and child 
labor, but when credit constraints exist. He shows that since borrowing against the future 
earnings of children is not possible, when individuals have different abilities, unskilled 
workers would send their children to work, while skilled parents would send their children   11
to school. He also shows that greater inequality is associated with greater incidence of 
child labor.  
 However, the empirical impact of regional income inequality has not been widely 
studied- as noted by Basu (1999). This paper examines the impact of income inequality, 
controlling for market wages, on the probability of households supplying child labor. The 
intuition here is that holding constant market wages, high income inequality driven by 
unequal distribution in land ownership, assets, or other sources of non-labor income would 
lead some households, to be more likely to supply child labor to compensate for their lack 
of non-labor income.   
 
3. The Data   
This study uses individual level data from the 1988 Labour Force Sample Survey, a 
nationally representative sample of 10,000 households, which was carried out by the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) in Egypt.
10 The survey 
provides detailed information on the employment and socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals 6 years of age or more.
11 The analysis is based on 10742 children aged 
between 6-14 years old for whom full information on schooling, labour participation and 
parents’ characteristics are available.  
  A child is classified as economically active, by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), if the child is remunerated for that work, or if the output of this work 
is destined for the market. This definition is also adopted here.
12 Hence a child is 
considered to be working whether he/she is being paid for work, or is working for his/her 
family and is unpaid for work destined for the market.  There are no data on household 
chores activities carried out by those children. This is a limitation of the data set used, and   12
therefore of the paper, since children tend to help with child care and household chores 
and may spend a considerable amount of time undertaking those activities.   
 
*****  Insert Table 1***** 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of children between 6-14 
years old by gender. The first column provides the characteristics of all children in the 
sample. Columns 2 and 3 show the characteristics of school and non-school participants. 
Although school non-participation rate is 9% among boys, it is almost 24% among girls. 
Almost 87% of girls who do not go to school live in rural areas. In addition, the majority 
of school non-goers tend to come from families where the parents have no, or very little, 
education.  
  Columns 4 – 7, in Table 1, display the characteristics of working and non-working 
children where the reference period used was the previous year. Boys have higher labour 
market participation rates than girls (22% compared to 15%). However, boys seem to have 
equal participation rates in paid and unpaid work, while the proportion of girls who 
participates in unpaid work (12%) is almost four times that those who are engaged in paid 
work (3%). Since Egyptian labour law stipulates a minimum age for employment of 12, 
two age groups are distinguished: 6-11 and 12-14 years old.
13 Indeed, over 40 % of 
working children are less than 12 years old. Around three-quarters of working children are 
engaged in agriculture. This is consistent with evidence from other developing countries 
where the majority of working children tend to work in agriculture and in non-paid work. 
Among working boys who do not go to school (column 3), 53% are engaged in agriculture 
and the rest in manufacturing and services, suggesting that non-school participation is 
correlated with working in non-agriculture activities. Also, half of the paid working boys   13
are engaged in production (column 5). Parents of non-working children are on average 
more educated than those of working children. Seventeen percent of children in female-
headed households are working for wage, while only 11% are unpaid workers. More than 
half of the working children - 57% of boys and 59% of girls- come from families where 
the father was child labourer. Finally, although around 20% of mothers in the total sample 
were child labourers, 39% of working boys have mothers who were child labourers.  
 
*****  Insert Table 2***** 
 
  More than half the working children (57%) are also attending school. On average, 
children work 5.3 hours per day and 57% of working children reported working 7 days a 
week.
14 Table 2 presents the child labour and schooling participation patterns of children 
by gender, rural/urban areas and age groups. First, 8% of children do not work or go to 
school. This group is comprised mainly of girls (83%) who are most probably involved in 
household chores.  Secondly, 11% of all children in the 6-14 years old cohort combine 
working and studying. Many Egyptian public schools operate up to three-shift schedules 
(4 hours each) a day due to government resource constraints, which seems to 
accommodate for the dual activities of children. Work and study combination is more 
common among boys, among 12-14 years old, and in rural areas. In fact, more boys tend 
to combine working and studying (16%) compared to only working (7%). The majority of 
children in urban areas are enrolled in schooling and only 3% work and do not go to 
school.  
 
4. The Econometric Model   14
To study how variations in market adult wages across provinces and having parents who 
were child labourers affect the decisions of a representative household to supply child 
labour and demand child schooling, a reduced form model is used. The estimation method 
used here reflects the decision making process. Schooling and work are not treated as two 
independent decisions nor as a sequential process.
15 First, using a sequential choice model 
would involve a number of strong assumptions concerning the hierarchy of the decision 
making. The four choices of interest here are: work only, schooling only, work and 
schooling, and no work & no schooling. However, there is no clear ordering of those 
options. If the child's welfare is the main concern then schooling only is the first choice- 
see Grootaert (1998), but if the household is poor and rely on the child for survival, then 
schooling and work may become the first option. However, if the household's welfare, 
rather than the child 's, is the main concern, then the ranking of the choices becomes 
unclear.  
  Second, using a multinomial logit choice model assumes that all the options are 
considered simultaneously and are independent- the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In other words, using a multinomial logit model would imply 
that the decision to work is independent from other options, and is not affected by whether 
or not a schooling option is available.   
  In this paper, it is assumed that the decisions are interdependent and a bivarite probit 
model is used because it allows for the existence of possible correlated disturbances 
between the two decisions. Bivarite probit models also allow us to test for the existence 
and significance of the interdependence of these two decisions.  
 
Let the latent variable
*
1 y  represent the decision of working and 
*
2 y  the decision of 
schooling. The general specification of a two-equation model is    15
otherwise y y if y x y 0 , 0 1 , 1
*
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whereρ  is the coefficient of correlation between the two equations. The first dependent 
variable is defined 1 if the child is economically active in the labour market and 0 
otherwise. The second dependent variable is defined 1 if the child participates in schooling 
and 0 otherwise. xi1 and xi2 are the two sets of explanatory variables explaining the 
probability of working and the probability of attending schooling respectively, namely 
market wages and whether the parents were child labourers, in addition to the 
characteristics of the child, parents, household, and region which are used as control 
variables and are explained below.  
 
i) Market Wages 
First, to examine the impact of adult market wages on the household decision to 
supply child labour, I exploit the variability in market wages across various labour market 
areas in Egypt. Then, by controlling for households' characteristics which might influence 
child labour supply, I can study how variations in market adult wages across provinces 
affect the decisions of a representative household to supply child labour and demand child 
schooling. Unfortunately, published statistical sources do not report wages at the level of 
disaggregation needed here. I circumvent this problem by using the earnings module in the 
1988 LFSS, which provides actual hours worked and wages for workers, to calculate 
hourly market wages separately for the urban and rural areas of each province 
(governorate), but I correct for clustering and heteroscedasticity as a result of using 
individual level data.
16    16
Since our interest here is in testing the sensitivity of household supply of child 
labour to adult market wages especially at very low levels of wages, it could be argued that 
wages of adults with no education are the most relevant ones. Table 1 shows that around 
40 percent of adult males and 75 percent of adult females in our sample are illiterates. 
Using the illiterate market wage is superior to using the average market wage for all 
educational groups because the illiterate market wage is less noisy since it is not 
influenced by the educated public sector wages and government employment which would 
provide an inflated measure of the average market wage depending on the local size of the 
public sector. Also, using the illiterate market wage is better than using the agricultural 
wage which would only be of relevance to rural agricultural areas. In addition, for policy 
intervention focusing on wages of those with no education is the most appropriate. Both 
male and female adult wages are used to capture the different impact each may have on 
child labour and schooling Thus, the log of adult market hourly wages of illiterate males 
and females by rural and urban area in every province relative to the national average are 
used.
17  
Also, the log of child market hourly wage by rural and urban area in every 
province relative to the national average is included. Even when children are unpaid 
family workers, high child wages would make it expensive for households to employ 
children from outside the household, thus requiring their own children to work.  On the 
other hand, the effect of child market wage on the probability of child participating in 
schooling is an indirect one because it is the opportunity cost of not working.    
 
ii) Income Inequality 
Since the concern here is with examining the impact of market wages on child 
labour decision, I control for local income distribution using the Gini coefficient at the   17
governorate/province. The Gini coefficient is based on consumption expenditure, and thus 
captures earnings as well as non-labour income and wealth.
18 The intuition here is that 
controlling for provincial income inequality driven by unequal distribution in land 
ownership, assets, or other sources of non-labour income, one can better examine the 
sensitivity of the supply of child labour to market wages.   
 
iii) Parental history and Social Norms  
To explore the impact of the parents being child labourers themselves on the probability of 
the children working and/or going to school is studied by allowing for separate effects for 
both the father and mother. The 1988 LFSS asks each individual the age at which they 
first entered the labour market. A parent is considered a child labourer if he/she has started 
labour market work at the age of 14 years old or before.  One possible reason behind the 
inter-generational persistence of child labour is the child labour-poverty trap explanation 
which is discussed in Emerson and Souza (2003). A parent who has been raised in poor 
family, where he/she had to work as child himself/herself which constrained him/her 
ability to invest in schooling and condemned him/her to low wage or poverty as an adult, 
will tend to send his/her children to work in turn. However, another potentially important 
reason for the persistence of child labour is social norm. To capture the impact of social 
norms in the intergenerational persistence of poverty rather than the influence of poverty 
trap due to lack of human capital, I control for the education of the parents. Four 
educational dummies are used for each parent: illiterate, less than primary (less than 6 
years of basic education), primary, and more than primary education.  In addition, to 
control for the nature of the parents' employment and the impact of the father having a 
stable regular job, a dummy variable indicating whether the father is employed in the 
Public Sector is also included   18
iv) Child’s and Household’s Characteristics:  
Separate estimates for boys and girls are reported since the determinants of child 
labour and schooling may be gender specific. I control for the child's age, but also estimate 
the model separately for 6-11 and 12-14 years old since the Egyptian labour law stipulates 
a minimum age for employment of 12.  
In addition I control for other household characteristics. A dummy is used to 
capture the impact of female headed household. Also to control for non-labour income, a 
dummy is included for whether there are any return overseas migrants in the household, 
since return migrants may be less credit constrained if they have acquired overseas 
savings. Finally, the number of siblings less than six years old in the household is also 
included to capture the need for child care which in many instances is done by older 
sisters and would affect girls’ participation in the labour force and in schooling.  
 
v)  Regional Characteristics: 
Another important factor, which affects the supply of child labour, is the availability of 
children's jobs. For example, child labour is higher in rural areas where children tend to 
work for their families. Children are not as mobile as adults and would tend to work near 
where they live. Thus, accessibility of jobs seems to be an important factor that would 
affect the supply of child labour. If children are located in a province where there is no 
access to jobs, one would expect that the willingness of the households to supply child 
labour would be lower since the alternative would be incurring higher cost (transportation, 
effort and time). To control for the accessibility of jobs in a province, three variables are 
used. First, to capture the degree of informality in the local labour market the percent of 
adults in non-regular – casual and seasonal - employment in the rural/urban area of the 
province is used. Secondly, the share of adult workers employed in Public Sector in the   19
rural/urban area in the province is included. Finally, the percentage of adult workers 
engaged in manufacturing, in the rural or urban area, in the province is used to control for 
the industrial composition of the local labour market. However, the model was also 
estimated without these three labour market variables, and the results were unchanged.  
One of the limitations of the data set used in this paper is the lack of information 
on variables that may affect the demand for schooling, for example, school availability, 
accessibility (distance to school), quality of schooling, and cost of schooling. Previous 
studies - for example, Bonnet (1993) and Hanushek and Levy (1993) - point to the 
importance of school accessibility and school quality in determining the schooling 
participation decision. So, six regional dummies capturing the household’s region of 
residence are used to control for school availability and quality in the school participation 
equation: Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Canal Cities, Lower Urban, Upper Urban, Lower 
Rural and Upper Rural. One would expect that in rural areas because of poor schooling 
facilities, children would be less likely to attend school compared to in urban areas. In 
addition, children in the poorer rural areas - the south (Upper Rural Egypt) - are expected 
to have lower probability of going to school compared to children in other rural areas - in 
the north (Lower Rural Egypt).  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
Before discussing the empirical findings, it is important to examine whether the estimation 
technique adopted here is the best one to model the two decisions under study. A 
multinomial model was estimated and Hausman's test was carried out to test for the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA). The results of the Hausman’s 
test rejected that assumption indicating that a multinomial model would not have been 
appropriate. Using bivarite probit estimation, the correlation coefficientρ  is found to be   20
significant in all the models implying that working and schooling are not independent and 
thus the choice of this estimation technique is appropriate. In addition, the correlation 
coefficientρ  is negative and significant indicating that there is a trade-off between child 
labour and child schooling choices, which is bigger in urban areas, and for males.  
 
*****  Insert Table 3***** 
 
First, the impact of market wages is examined. The findings in Table 3 show a 
strong negative relationship between illiterate adult male and female market wages and 
child participation in the labour market: the higher the adult male and female provincial 
wages relative to the national average, the lower is the probability of child labour. It is 
interesting to note that this negative relationship exists for both boys and girls for both 
paid and unpaid work  (Table 3), in rural and urban areas (Tables 3 & 4), and for both age 
groups: 6-11 and 12-14 years old (Table 5). In addition, the findings also indicate that the 
higher is the child market wage, the more likely a child will work.    
 
*****  Insert Tables 4 and 5 ***** 
 
To check the robustness of these results, two tests are undertaken. First, I examine 
the responsiveness of households’ child labour supply to market wages for those 
households who are potentially close to the threshold of a subsistence level and restrict the 
sample to those households where both parents are illiterates. The effect of illiterate adult 
market wages on the labour market participation of children of illiterate parents are shown 
in Table 6. The results support the previous findings and also indicate that the   21
responsiveness of child labour participation to adult market wages is stronger for those 
children who come from households where both parents are illiterate.  
 
*****  Insert Table 6***** 
 
Secondly, a tobit model is used to estimate the determinants of the number of 
weekly hours of child labour. The same set of explanatory variables are included. The 
uncensored sample is limited to only 1154 child workers (out of 1988) for whom the 
number of weekly hours worked are available. Table 7 shows that there is a negative 
relationship between male and female illiterate adult wages and weekly hours of child 
work and provide further evidence in support of the previous findings. 
*****  Insert Table 7***** 
 
The influence of illiterate adult male market wage on the probability of schooling 
is not only positive and significant, but also has bigger impact than the adult female 
illiterate market wage. The higher the provincial male market wage, relative to the 
national average, the more are the odds of child attending schooling. Adult female market 
wages have positive, but smaller impact on the likelihood of school participation of boys 
compared to adult male market wage. However, adult female market wage has negative 
impact on the schooling decision of girls. The higher the adult female wage, the lower is 
the probability of female school participation. One explanation is that higher female adult 
wages increase female labour market participation outside the household, which in turn 
may mean that daughters are needed at home to do household chores instead of the 
mother. The child market wage does not seem to have significant effect on the child 
schooling decision, though it has the expected negative impact suggesting that the higher   22
the child market wage, the greater is the opportunity cost of attending schooling.
19 In the 
case of girls, though, it appears that the opportunity cost of their schooling is not their 
own forgone wages, but those of their mothers (adult females).   
*****  Insert Tables 8 and 9***** 
 
  Table 9 summarises the influence of illiterate adult market wages on the 
probability of child participation in the labour force by gender and region. It displays the 
changes in the predicted probability of child labour - given in Table 8 Column 2- as a 
result of a 1 percent change in the provincial adult market wage relative to the national 
average. A 10 percent increase in the male illiterate market wage decreases the 
probability of child labour by 21.5 percent for boys and 13.1 percent for girls, while, a 
similar rise in female illiterate wage rate, lowers the probability of child participation in 
the labour market by 18.5 percent for boys and 4.3 percent for girls. In rural areas, a 10 
percent increase in female illiterate wage, decreases the likelihood of child labour by 19.0 
percent for boys and 7.2 percent for girls. Also, another important finding is that the 
impact of adult market wages is bigger for the 12-14 years old than for the 6-11 group. In 
other words, lower adult wages increase the probability of child labour among the 12-14 
years old by more than it does for the younger children. 
  It is interesting to compare these results to previous findings, though caution is 
required since those studies are all based on aggregate level data, and they estimate 
simultaneously fertility and child work. Levy (1985) finds that a 10 percent increase in 
female market wage rates reduces employment of children by 27 percent for 6-11 years 
old and by 15 percent for 12-14 years old, in rural Egypt. However, he finds that an 
increase in male wage rates increases employment of children.
20 Rosenzweig (1981) finds 
that in rural India, a 10 percent increase in adult male wages reduces boys' labour supply   23
by 10 percent, but have no effect on girls, while a 10 percent increase in adult female 
wages decreases girls' participation in the labour market by 9-10 percent, but have no 
effect on boys' employment. Thus, using individual level data provide a clearer and more 
robust picture, than those provided by aggregate (village or district) level data, of the 
influence of market wages on child labour.  
   To sum up, illiterate adult market wages seem to (i) have strong negative influence 
on the probability of paid and unpaid child work, (ii) have greater impact in rural areas 
than in urban areas, (iii) have smaller absolute effect on the probability of school 
participation compared to on child labour. Low market wages seem to be one of the key 
determinants of child labour. 
The second main finding of the paper is that having a parent who was child 
labourer increases the probability of the child working. This effect exits even though we 
are controlling for parents’ education. Thus, this suggests that the inter-generational 
persistence of child labour has to be for reasons beyond those of human capital and its 
implications on income. Hence, the findings indicate that social norms may be responsible 
for the persistence of child labour. The effect of having a mother who was child labourer 
is twice as much as that of having a father who was child labourer for both boys and girls. 
Having a mother who was child labourer increases the likelihood of child labour by 10 
percent for boys, while having a father who was child labourer increases the probability of 
child work by 5 percent. It is also interesting to note that the impact of parents being child 
labourers is bigger on the 12-14 years old than on the younger group. However, having a 
parent who worked as a child labourer does not significantly affect the likelihood of child 
schooling.  
Turning now to the effect of income inequality, the results indicate that living in a 
province where there is greater local income inequality raises the probability of child   24
labour. This finding is robust in both urban and rural areas, and for both genders. Thus, the 
evidence supports the existence of a positive relationship between income inequality and 
child labour. 
  Parents’ characteristics play an important role in influencing the working and 
schooling decisions of children. Having a father who is employed in the Public sector 
increases the probability of the child attending school and decreases that of working.   
Moreover, having less educated parents increase the likelihood of child labour and 
decreases that of investing in schooling. As found in earlier studies, father's education 
affects boys more than mother’s education, while the opposite is true for girls. The 
empirical findings also suggest that household characteristics influence child labour and 
schooling. Living in a household where the head is female, does not affect the probability 
of participating in the labour market, but it increases the likelihood of investing in 
schooling. Having younger siblings at the household increases the odds of child labour 
and decreases that of schooling. The presence of return overseas migrants at the household 
has negative (though not always significant) effect on the likelihood of child work. This 
variable is capturing the effect of non-labour income, namely, overseas savings and 
remittances. However, having a return overseas migrant has positive impact on the 
schooling decision. This suggests that return migrants tend to invest in education.       
The characteristics of the local labour market seem to have bigger impact on the 
probability of child labour in rural areas than in urban ones. The findings indicate that 
local labour market characteristics affect the probability of paid child labour in both urban 
and rural areas. The higher the share of adults engaged in manufacturing, the lower is the 
probability of child participation in the labour market, though it is more significant for 
girls than boys. In other words, the share of adults engaged in manufacturing has negative, 
though insignificant, impact on boys' work. Also, the share of adults employed in the   25
public sector in the local labour market has strong negative impact on child labour for both 
genders. The percentage of adults engaged in non-regular employment has a positive 
significant influence on the likelihood of paid child labour.   Those two variables capture 
the degree of informality in the local labour market and suggest that the higher the 
informality in the labour market, the more likely children would work. However, the 




Understanding the main determinants of child labour is essential for formulating 
effective policies in tackling child labour. This paper provides empirical evidence on the 
influence of market wages and having parents who were child labourers on the decision to 
supply child labour. The estimates are drawn from a model in which child labour is 
allowed to be jointly determined with child schooling.  
The main findings of the paper are the following. Market adult wages have a 
strong negative influence on the probability of child working. In addition, parents who 
were child labourers themselves are on average 10 percent more likely to send their 
children to work. Higher income inequality within a province/ region also increases the 
likelihood of child labour. There is a trade-off between child labour and child schooling. 
To sum, the empirical findings suggest that low adult market wages are key determinants 
of child labour, and that social norms may be responsible for the inter-generational 
persistence of child labour.  
Several policy implications emerge from this paper. First, since child labour is 
found to be sensitive to local market illiterate adult wages, then a viable policy would be 
to target provinces or regions where illiterate adult wages are low. One policy option to   26
reduce child labour and increase child schooling would be to provide cash transfers to 
children to attend school in low wage provinces. For example, Mexico introduced a 
similar social program – PROGRESA- which provides cash transfers linked to children’s 
enrolment and regular school attendance which has been successful in increasing school 
enrolment and reducing child labour. This suggested policy has several advantages. First, 
providing cash transfers to children in low wage provinces unlike, for example, increasing 
minimum wages will not lead to higher adult unemployment. In addition, raising female 
adult wages might lead as suggested by the empirical findings to lower probability of girls 
participating in schooling since girls may be kept at home to do the household chores 
instead of the mother. Furthermore, such cash transfers can be gender and age specific. 
For example, the results show that work amongst children 12-14 years old is more 
sensitive to the explanatory variables and household characteristics than that for younger 
children, 6-11. Thus, higher cash transfers to the 12-14 years old could be used to reduce 
child labour for that age group to entice them to carry on going to school. In fact, the size 
of the PROGRESA benefit grant increases through grades and at the secondary level 
grants are higher for females who are more likely to drop-out of school. Finally, since 
policies that reduce the current child labour supply therefore also serve to reduce child 
labour in future, the results suggest that returns to such policies in terms of reductions in 
child work are greater than hitherto perceived.    27
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  




















































6-11  66.1  66.8  68.9 71.6 41.2 52.2 41.0 44.2 28.4  47.1  48.5  43.6  73.5  70.8 
12-14  33.9  33.2  31.1 28.4 58.8 47.8 59.0 55.8 71.6  52.9  51.5  56.4  26.5  29.2 
 
Educational Level (%) 
None  13.0  29.2 ----  ----  77.1 89.5 27.7 58.5 38.1  59.2  20.6  58.3  5.8  21.3 
Read  and  write  57.0  46.9  66.6 66.8 13.2  7.8  40.5 26.7 30.7  30.8  47.1  25.8 65.0  52.3 
Primary  30.0  23.9  33.4 33.2  9.7  2.7  31.8 14.8 31.2  10.0  32.3  15.9 29.2  26.4 
 
Region (%) 
                    
Greater  Cairo  19.1  20.2  25.0  21.2  10.9 5.7  9.1  2.7 19.4  3.9 2.2 2.7 22.3 23.2 
Alex  and  Canal  Cities  7.7  8.0  7.8 9.6 4.0 3.5 2.6 1.2 3.8  1.8  1.9  1.1 8.9  9.3 
Lower Urban   9.0  8.2  9.4  10.2  6.2  2.1 6.8 3.0  10.1  3.4  4.8  2.9 9.6  9.1 
Upper Urban  4.2  4.3  4.4 5.0 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.3 2.6  0.6  1.3  1.4 5.0  4.8 
Lower  Rural  31.8  32.6  31.5 30.6 35.1 38.7 47.0 59.3 30.5  58.4  56.9  59.5 27.3  27.9 




Agriculture  ---  --- 74.9 87.4 53.1 91.0 68.3 89.6 40.0  86.6  87.4  90.2  ---  --- 
Manufacturing  ---  --- 7.9  3.2 21.0 5.6 12.0 6.7 26.9  9.8 3.4 3.6  ---  --- 
Construction  --- --- 3.2 0.2 7.3 0.3 3.6 0.2 7.6  1.2  1.3 0  ---  --- 
Trade  --- ---  10.3  9.0 1.0 0.1 9.4 5.3 8.8  2.4  9.7  6.0 ---  --- 




Sales  Workers  --- --- 8.7 9.5 5.0 2.9 7.7 5.4 6.7  2.4  8.2  6.1 ---  --- 
Services  Workers  ---  ---  2.4 0 1.6 0 2.3 0 4.0  0  1.3  0 ---  --- 
Agricultural  Workers  ---  --- 74.9 87.0 53.0 90.6 68.1 89.2 39.6  86.6  84.6  90.8  ---  --- 
Production  Workers  ---  --- 14.0 3.5 39.9 6.5 21.9 5.4 49.7  11.0  5.9 4.1  ---  ---   31 
Table 1.  Continued 









Paid  Workers  Unpaid 
Workers  
Non -LF  
Participants 
  M F  M  F M F M F M F M F  M  F 
 
Father’s Characteristics 
          
Father was Child Labourer  (%)  41.1  41.0  40.0  37.8 51.1 51.6 56.9 58.5 44.2 46.0 64.5 61.3  36.4  38.0 
Public Sector Employee (%)  32.0  31.8  34.2  38.0  13.5  13.0  18.6  15.0  20.5  10.1  17.5  16.1  36.0  34.8 
 
Father’s Education (%):  
          
Illiterate  42.0 42.4  38.5  32.9 70.3 70.9 55.9 57.6 55.9 65.1 55.9 55.9  37.9  39.7 
                          Read and write  23.4  23.8  24.5  26.6  14.8  15.5  23.7  22.0  20.0  12.1  15.9  24.5  23.3  24.1 
                           Primary  8.9  8.4  9.5  10.3  2.7  2.8  5.4  4.0  5.9  1.4  5.1  7.5  9.8  9.2 
                           More than Primary  25.7  25.4  27.5  30.8  12.2  10.8  15.0  16.4  18.2  21.4  23.1  12.1  26.8  27.0 
 
Mother’s Characteristics 
Mother was Child Labourer (%)  19.9  18.9  19.1  17.3 26.3  23.7 39.1 14.1 23.1 46.0 48.7  35.5  14.2  48.4 
Mother’s Education (%):   





























             Read and write  9.1  9.1  9.7  11.3  4.0  2.7  6.4  10.1  5.9  3.8  6.7  3.3  9.9  3.9 
                           Primary  5.4  5.3  5.8  7.0  1.6  1.0  2.9  6.0  3.9  1.1  2.3  1.0  6.1  1.2 
                           More than Primary  10.3  10.2  11.3  13.1  2.5  1.0  2.4  11.6  2.9  2.5  2.1  6.0  12.7  1.8 
 
Household’s Characteristics 
Female Headed Household (%)  12.0  11.8  12.1  12.2 11.1 10.6 12.0 11.4 15.8 13.7  9.6  19.3  12.0  12.5 
Mean number of children < 6 years old   1.2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.1  1.2  1.5 
HH with overseas return migrants (%)  17.7  16.8  18.2  17.8 14.1 13.9 16.1 17.0 17.5 15.8 15.2  11.3  18.2  16.9 
Sample Size (N)  10742  9043  1699  1988  605  1383  8754 
Total Sample (%)  100 84.2 15.8 18.5 5.6  12.9  81.5 
 
a  M: is male; F: is female. 
b A distinction is made between children who are paid and those who work for the family and are unpaid labourers though their output is destined for the market- 
columns 5 and 6.  
c Industry and Occupation apply only to working children.   
Table 2. Labour Force and Schooling Participation Rate of Children 6-14 years old (%) 





















Boys 15.1  7.1  75.1  2.7  100 
Girls 6.0  8.7  71.9  13.4  100 
 
Region 
Urban 5.0  3.3  87.6  4.1  100 
Rural 16.4  12.6  59.2  11.9  100 
 
Age Group 
6-11 years old  7.9  4.0  80.8  7.3  100 
12-14 years old  15.9  15.6  59.4  9.1  100   33
 
Table 3. Determinants of Child Labour and Schooling: Rural & Urban Areas (Marginal Effects) 
Variable Boys  Girls 
 Work  School  Paid 
Work 
School Work School Paid 
Work 
School 
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Father's Education  (ref.: illiterate) 
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Mother’s Education (ref.: illiterate)  































(5.34)   34
 
Table 3. Continued 
Household Characteristics 
















Number of children 





































Adults engaged in 
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Region (ref.: G. Cairo) 


























































































Sample size   5466   5466   5276   5276 
Log likelihood  -3422.40  -2636.60  -3361.70  -2445.93 
   Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
   Δ is coefficient of correlation between the two equations.  
   Marginal effects show the increment in the probability evaluated at the sample mean for the reference group. 
   The reference group: a child whose father and mother are illiterates and who lives in Greater Cairo.   35
 
Table 4. Determinants of Child Labour and Schooling: Rural Areas (Marginal Effects) 
Variable Boys  Girls 
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Local Income Inequality 






Parents  Being Child Labourers 
































































Number of children less than 6 




















Adults engaged in 




















Region (ref.: Upper Rural)       








Δ  -0.56 (14.47)  -0.51 (15.38) 
Sample size   2674  2625 
Log likelihood  -2158.51  -2483.36 
       Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
       The reference group: a child whose father and mother are not illiterates and who lives in Upper Rural Egypt. 
 
Table 5.  Determinants of Child Labour and Schooling: By Age Group (Marginal Effects)   36
 
Variable Boys  Girls 
  6-11 years old  12-14 years old  6-11 years old  12-14 years old 
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Local Income Inequality 









Parents  Being Child Labourers 











































































































Number of children less 




































Adults engaged in 










Adults employed in 










Adults engaged in non-










Δ  -0.544 (12.74)  -0.751 (25.77)  -0.538 (12.13)  -0.518 (12.74) 
Sample size   3599  1867  3522  1745 
Log  likelihood  -1779.60  -1589.74 -1880.54 -1463.94 
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Regional dummies were also included. 
    The reference group: a child whose father and mother are not illiterates and who lives in Greater Cairo.   37
 
Table 6.  Determinants of Child Labour and Schooling among Children of Illiterate Parents  
(Marginal Effects) 
Variable Boys  Girls 
  Rural & Urban  Rural only  Rural & Urban  Rural only 
  Work  School Work School Work  School  Work School 
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Table 6. Continued 
 
Region (ref.: G. Cairo) 
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Sample size   2069   1273   2020   1277 
Log likelihood  -1684.86  -1149.83  -1814.56  -1351.46 
   Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses.    39
 
Table 7. Tobit Model of Weekly Hours of Child Work 
Variable Boys  Girls 
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Table 7. Continued 


























































Sample size   5462  2674  5278  2623 
No of uncensored observations  604  446  550  480 
No of censored observations  4858  2228  4728  2143 
Wald chi2   716.10  323.24  875.61  1029.28 
Log likelihood  -4212.03  -2949.70  -3614.98  -3059.81 
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance is 
used. 
a The reference group: a child who lives in Greater Cairo and whose parents are both illiterates. 
 b The reference group: a child who lives in Upper Rural and whose parents are both illiterates.   41
 
 
Table 8.  Predicted Probabilities of Child Labour and Schooling (%) 
  Working and Studying  Working Only  Studying Only 
Total Sample (Urban and Rural Areas)  
Boys 15.44  6.87 74.46 
Girls 5.68  8.94 72.53 
 
Rural Areas 
Boys 23.14  11.72 60.44 
Girls 8.75  15.00  58.65 
 
Urban Areas 
Boys   8.06  2.23  87.90 
Girls 2.64  2.95 86.27 
 
6 - 11 years old 
Boys   10.49  4.11  82.24 
Girls 3.66  5.17 79.06 
 
12 - 14 years old 
Boys   24.98  12.19  59.49 
Girls 9.74  16.52  59.41 
   42
 
Table 9. The Effect of Adult Market Wages on the Predicted Probability of Child Working 
(%)
a 
 Boys  Girls 
Total Sample (Urban and Rural) 
Male Market Wages  -2.15  -1.31 




Male Market Wages  -2.51  -2.17 




Male Market Wages  -1.88  -1.36 
Female Market Wages  -1.75  -0.41 
 
6 - 11 years old 
Male Market Wages  -1.30  -1.30 
Female Market Wages  -1.90  -0.14 
 
12 - 14 years old 
Male Market Wages  -3.66  -2.48 
Female Market Wages  -3.05  -1.62 
a The change in the predicted probability of child working as a result of a 1 % change in provincial market adult 




1 This accounted for a little less than one fifth of all children between 5 and 14 years old in 2000- ILO (2002). 
2 They find that school enrolment subsidy in Bangladesh increased school attendance, but reduced the incidence 
of child labour by only a small proportion.    
3 The fact that children may be working and going to school at the same time may affect their educational 
attainment is beyond the scope of this study, but is important.   
4 Many educational systems in LDCs are organised into shifts, for example, Bangladesh - Ravallion and Wodon 
(2000), Peru - Patrinos and Pscaharopoulos (1997) and Egypt - Hanushek and Levy (1993).    
5 Bhalotra and Heady (2003) use community-level variables to instrument household income in rural Ghana and 
Pakistan. Bhalotra (2001) instruments out household income and child wage, and estimates structural labour 
supply models for rural boys and girls in wage work. She finds a significant negative wage elasticity for boys 
whereas the wage elasticity for girls is not significantly different from zero in rural Pakistan. She does not study 
the impact of adult market wages though. 
6 Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) provide the basic model in this literature analysing the joint family decision 
regarding the number of children and children’s time allocated to schooling and work and show that Indian 
families have many children as a result of the high return to the use of child labour.  
7 Diamond and Fayed (1998) using a flexible form production function show that adult male labour is 
complement to child labour, while adult female labour is substitute to child labour in Egypt. 
8 It is worth noting that this paper provides an alternative explanation for the intergenerational persistence of 
child labour to that suggested by Emerson and Souza (2003). However neither paper can provide a definitive 
test for its suggested explanation. 
9 Swinnerton and Rogers (2000) show that a more equal income distribution can reduce child labour in higher 
productivity countries, but not in low productivity countries. They find supporting empirical evidence using 
cross-country data and the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality.     
10 There are 26 governorates/provinces and six regions in Egypt. Four provinces (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said 
and Canal Cities) are urban only, while the rest of the provinces are made up of both urban and rural areas.  
11The 1988 LFSS survey included, for the first time, several individual modules, which collected extensive data 
on particular aspects, e.g. labour market earnings, migration and child labour. See Fergany (1991) for a detailed 
discussion on the sampling and questionnaire design of the 1988 LFSS.  
12 The 1988 LFSS adopted the 1982 ILO definition of employment. Hence, unpaid family work is considered 
economic activity except if it results in goods and services meant entirely for household consumption.  
13 This legislation does not apply to family businesses, domestic work or agriculture. However, the minimum 
working age is lower than the required age of compulsory education which is 15 years.   
14 Data on the number of working hours and days are only available for 1154 out of 1988 working children.  
15 Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Nielsen (1998) also use bivarite probits. However, various other 
estimation techniques have been used to capture different decision making processes: Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1997) and Jensen & Nielsen (1997) assume that the two decisions are independent and 
therefore use logit models; Grootaert (1998) uses a sequential binary probit model where a certain hierarchy of 
choices is assumed to capture a sequential decision making process. 
16 Since using grouped (aggregated) data in individual level regressions, can potentially result in the standard 
errors being biased because of the correlation of the error term across individuals in a region or industry- 
Moulton (1990), I correct for the correlation of error terms across individuals within province. In addition the 
robust (Huber/White/sandwich) estimator of the variance is used in place of the conventional Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation variance estimator. 
17 Market wages are calculated using the 1988 LFSS earnings module which was conducted on a sample of 
15000 workers. Relative wages are used as opposed to absolute wages for normalisation purposes. The 
correlation between child wage and illiterate adult wages is weak: the child - male wage correlation is 0.056, 
and the child - female wage correlation is 0.275. However, the male-female wage correlation is 0.396. 
18 Data on the "Gini" coefficient are from Egypt: Human Development Report 1994 and measure expenditure 
based on household budget surveys that capture earnings, non-labour income and wealth. The 1988 LFSS did 
not collect information on individual household expenditure or landholdings. 
19 Levy (1985) also finds that wage-child effect has the right sign but is not significant. 
20 Levy (1985) uses pooled cross section (at the governorate level) and time series data (for the period 1974-77) 
to examine the importance of cropping pattern and mechanisation for family size and child schooling in rural 
Egypt. He estimates simultaneously a set of regression equations explaining the regional variation in fertility, 
school enrolment and child labour participation rates.   